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Junior Officer Retention: Another Perspective
Retention is a critical and serious problem in the all-volunteer Navy.
Retaining junior officers is an important dimension of that problem.
Admiral Hayward, in the current report of the CNO, praises the Navy's
"people whose esprit, competence and potential continue to impress all who
have an opportunity to observe them in action, manning and supporting the
fleet worldwide. I strongly support the view that the quality of our people
represents one of our major advantages over the Soviets." Janes Fighting
Ships also emphasizes the experience and training (quality) of personnel as
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a critical factor in our maintaining some superiority over the seas.
Nevertheless, the Navy has not been able to meet its 1978 retention
objectives and estimates for FY 1980 predict an even wider gap between the
3
percentage of officers needed to be retained and those who actually stay.
Coupled with a projected decline in the number of young men available for
military service in the 1980s, this trend becomes even more serious. It is
so important that it has lead to the debate over whether or not to reinstate
the draft which is currently ongoing in Congress.
Before giving up the idea of the all-volunteer force, however, it is
important to be clear about what remedies might attract and hold competent
people. This article focuses on the requirements necessary to retain junior
officers in the U.S. Navy.
The research for the article was sponsored by the Office of Naval Research,
Organizational Effectiveness Research Program. The presentation of the data
and the conclusions and ideas are solely the responsibility of the author,
however, and should not be attributed to ONR.
2.
1 . Survey of the Literature
A review of the literature, much of it published in U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings , reveals that six issues are most frequently associated with junior
officers resigning their commissions.
Poor Career Benefits . Frequently, junior officers mention these major
reasons for leaving: lack of control over assignments, fewer educational op-
portunities, especially for postgraduate school, inadequate career counseling,
lack of continuous training, no basic allowance for quarters for single officers
poor medical care and no dependent dental care, annual antiinflation pay caps
imposed by the President on federal government employees but not observed by
other sectors, and the general erosion of such employee benetifs as discontin-
uance of the GI Bill, deteriorating health care, talk about modifying the
4
twenty-year retirement plan, etc.
Family Separations . Few careers demand such extended family separations
as the Navy does. The Navy's case is economic; to cross 4500 miles of ocean
at thirty knots, for example, requires seventeen days of straight steaming; it
makes sense to lengthen deployments. Moreover, the U.S. fleet is only half
as large as it was ten years ago. Fewer ships are being built and obsolete
warships are being retired, placing extra at-sea requirements on existing ships.
Add the manpower shortage and it's been inevitable that shore duty drops to
make officers available for sea duty.
However, money is the Navy's problem. Officers see the situation as a
personal problem. As one JO put it, "When they [the Army and Air Force] deploy,
the whole mob [family] goes with them to reside at an overseas base. We don't
5
do that. Our kids pay a price as human beings."
In a study by the Bureau of Naval Personnel, family moves and separations
c.
topped the list of reasons given by resigning officers. Built-in fragmenta-
tion of family life is inherently unappealing. Furthermore, the modern trend
3.
toward husbands and wives both sharing work and parenting means that the
pool of women willing to be their children's only real parent is shrinking.
There are no signs that this trend will change either, with forty percent of
all mothers working now and estimates predicting that two- thirds of America's
women will be employed by 1990. Fewer and fewer people are likely to see
Navy life as compatible with modern family life unless the Navy changes.
Loss of Esteem for the CO Role . Many junior officers on their way out
report a general loss of respect for some of their commanding officers but,
more importantly, a loss of esteem for the CO's yery role. They point out
that many problems lie beyond his control, yet he is still held responsible--
a scapegoat who receives more and more responsibility with less and less au-
thority and fewer and fewer resources. Thus, he is forced into crisis manage-
ment, always reacting to directives and constraints from above, his time con-
sumed by instructions, directives, surveys, inspections, statistics, and per-
centages. Fewer junior officers want to be a CO, which leaves them with few
options in a longterm career pattern.
One frequently cited reason is the military's generally bad post-Vietnam
image. As one JO author states,
"Congress, and even more so, the executive branch are
prime culprits in generating the retention crisis.
While the CNO stresses the importance of command (CO)
involvement and places the major responsibility at that
level, the onus is on him to start pushing up the chain
of command, not down. Continual attacks on the stature
of our military establishment greatly defrays overall
job satisfaction." 8
The public outside government circles shares this decreased support and respect
for the military, thus making the job of commander even more impossible and
unfulfilling. Moreover, officers clearly see it as another good reason for
getting into a more socially acceptable career.
Perceived "Greener Pastures." Many Naval officers feel they can have
an equally interesting civilian career with better employee benefits, fewer
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family separations, and better work conditions than the Navy offers, a per-
ception enthusiastically fostered by some civilian recruiters pursuing avi-
ators and nuclear submarine officers in particular. For example, it takes
an estimated $800,000 to train a carrier pilot; U.S. airlines will hire an
estimated 1,900 new pilots by 1985, 75 percent of them from the military.
Due to age and experience qualifications, the majority of these pilots will
have six to ten years experience; in other words, they will be the very of-
ficers the military would like to retain. If this loss actually occurs, the
Navy will be thirty-eight percent below its pilot retention requirement by
1984. 9
Similarly, nuclear-trained submarine officers are snapped up by the
civilian nuclear energy field, and an estimated two-thirds of the Navy sub-
marine JOs leave. In general, civilian employers perceive--and prize--
an officer's managerial experience, and any subspecialty (computer analysis,
nuclear engineering, pilot) makes them particularly attractive,
Bad Working Conditions . Many officers call their equipment "obsolete"
or "cannibalized." Spare parts for aircraft and ships are hard to come by,
yet combat readiness demands dangerous maneuvers almost continuously even
in peacetime. They see it as too risky. Another problem is unpleasant
12
shipboard quarters considering how long they live at sea. Furthermore,
many who would remain in the Navy because it is simply "more challenging
and fun" are discouraged when budget cuts eliminate the challenges--flying
1 ^
time or firing a practice missile. Finally, after six months at sea, they
find shore time decimated by the need to spend most of it overhauling ob-
14
solete equipment, a further discouragement.
Money . Analyzing these reasons from any perspective reveals two in-
escapable facts. First, almost ewery reason given for leaving is linked to
another one; second, money lies behind most of the dissatisfactions of officers
who are leaving. It's lockstep logic, inevitably resulting in a retention
problem: when Congress reduces the Navy budget, though not reducing Navy
commitments, new ships will not be built, older ships will not be modern-
ized, spare parts will get scarce, and pay and benefits will suffer. If no
juggling can produce new vessels, the Navy has to operate its older ships
while retiring even older ships and cannibalizing them for spare parts. With
fewer ships available, each unit has to spend more time at sea, fewer com-
mand positions are available, living conditions on older ships deteriorate
because modernization is too expensive, and family separations stretch out
longer and longer. Officers get fed up and leave. The remaining other of-
ficers get even less shore time and more duty, their own families feel the
pinch, and postgraduate education, upon which promotion may depend, is harder
to finish. The spiral is vicious.
2. Some Career Research Applied To The Problem
During 1977-78, the author and his colleagues, investigated U.S. Naval
officer career patterns, including factors related to the general retention
problem. This report discusses the information and suggests some recommenda-
tions.
We conducted a total of 154 interviews lasting forty-five to ninety
minutes each. Of those interviewed, 136 subjects also returned questionnaires
We talked with Naval officers from five different communities: line
officers from aviation, subsurface and surface warfare, and staff officers
from the civil engineering corps and supply corps. We broke aviators into sub-
groups: multiengine aircraft, helicopters, attack jets, and fighter jets.
Five Navy wives from each of these communities, a total of twenty-five, and
their husbands were studied as couples.
The average age of the officers in the sample was 31.6 years. Although
10 percent of the population was single, the rest of the group had been
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married an average of 8.08 years and had 1.6 children. About 12 percent had
been divorced. Only 19 percent reported that their wives were looking for or
had full-time outside- the-home employment.
On the average, they had been in the Navy 9.93 years and included four
ensigns, sixteen lieutenant junior grades, sixty-six lieutenants, sixty lieu-
tenant commanders, and eight commanders. About 41 percent of the group queried
came from rural backgrounds, 32 percent from urban/suburban, and 16 percent
from highly mobile (e.g., military) families. About 4 percent received their
college education at prestigious universities, 49 percent at well-reputed in-
stitutions (including the U.S. Naval Academy), 22 percent from lesser-known
colleges, and 25 percent at little-known institutions.
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The research considered retention from a career perspective. What
follows are the most important findings in terms of what impacts on keeping
competent junior officers in productive pursuit of a career in the U.S. Navy.
The findings raise some personnel policy questions to which the Navy must re-
spond if it would maintain a successful all-volunteer force.
a. Issues of Career "Fit.
"
Edgar Schein studied forty-four male alumni
of the Sloan School of Management at MIT, both during their time at MIT and
ten to twelve years after their graduation. As he probed why they made certain
kinds of career decisions, their responses made a pattern which helped explain
what happens during the five- to ten-year segment of a career history. Schein
postulated that while the early career (one to five years) was a period of
mutual study and discovery between employee and employer, midcareer is some-
what different. Between the fifth and tenth year, approximately, one gains a
clearer occupational self-concept. Schein lables this self-knowledge the
"career anchor."
The career anchor "serves to guide, constrain, stabilize and integrate
the person's career," says Schein (p. 127). It is "inside the person,
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functioning as a set of driving and constraining forces on career decisions
and choices" (p. 125). Thus the metaphor of an anchor connotes the composite
needs, values, attitudes, and abilities of an individual which tie him to a
certain kind of work history or career.
One discovers one's career anchor by coming to understand one's self-
perceived needs (based on the tests of real situations and feedback from
others), one's self-perceived abilities (based on a variety of work exper-
iences), and one's self-perceived work values and attitudes (based on en-
counters between the person and the employer's norms and values). It requires
real work experience to arrive at such an awareness. Career anchor assess-
ment depends not only on the needs and abilities one originally brings to the
work situation but also on the opportunities provided to broaden one's exper-
ience and on the quality of feedback from others.
Schein uncovered five major career anchors in the MIT group. Managerial
competence is the term he used to designate those with a strong need to get and
exercise managerial responsibility. They possess such managerial skills as
analyzing problems and handling people, and have the emotional stamina to with-
stand the pressures of the job. Most of these career types, naturally, wanted
work in large organizations.
The technical /functional career anchor characterizes people most con-
cerned with the quality of their work, who want to increase their proficiency
continuously, and who view their careers as prolonged refinements in their
area of expertise.
Another group was mainly concerned with long-term stability, location in
a given area, and job security. They were said to have a security anchor.
Others found it difficult to work in organizations and worked towards
personal space—freedom from close supervision and regulations. Schein labeled
these as having an autonomy anchor. Individuals with a creativity career anchor
had an overriding need to create something of their own: a new business,
product, or service.
For a careerist, identifying one's career anchor helps better identify
his long-term contributions, identify his personal criteria for choosing among
a variety of jobs and work settings, more accurately define what personal suc-
cess would be, and more clearly perceive how to organize life and work exper-
iences. The employing organization, recognizing that an individual's anchor
becomes more defined as time passes, will get the highest productivity by in-
vesting effort and time matching organizational needs with individual interests.
In short, each organization must provide multiple career options or be prepared
to lose executives during the five- to ten-year segment.
An analysis of the research data related to these concepts as employed
with U.S. Naval officers reveals that, in general, most officers have a tech-
nical career anchor (36.3 percent) followed closely by those who are managerial
in their orientation (33.9 percent). Of the remaining three anchors described
above by Schein, only 15.3 percent of the officer population queried would
possess a security anchor, while 10.4 percent would be in the creativity cate-
gory and only 4 percent autonomy.
It is interesting to note that aviators, one of the critical officer
shortage areas, possessed a very strong preference for the technical anchor
(63 percent of the officers were so judged, while only 24 percent were manager-
ial types). Submariners, on the other hand, had an anchor profile split with
36 percent technical, 36 percent managerial and 21 percent security. The Sur-
face Warfare community possessed an unequal number of managerial anchors (62.2
percent compared to 21 percent technical), and the Supply Corps was also com-
prised mostly of managerial types (56.5 percent v. 22.7 percent security and
14.2 percent technical). Among CEC officers there existed a more balanced
career anchor profile: 32.3 percent autonomy, 24 percent technical, 24 percent
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security and 16.6 percent managerial. This was the only sub-community where
many autonomy anchors could be found.
As this data shows, the Navy is likely to be especially attractive to
those with technical and managerial career anchors. It would be well to con-
sider ways to attract and hold these types of officers. Career development
policy is at present geared to managerial types, however. Those with tech-
nical anchors, like pilots, will likely become highly dissatisfied at that
transition. Perhaps dual or multiple career tracks are necessary. Furthermore,
since security is a generally high value for many Naval officers, the Navy
could strengthen its already strong appeal by improving the job security and
benefit package.
The negative implications of the data on career anchors is also impor-
tant. The Navy will simply have a difficult time accommodating officers with
autonomy and creativity career anchors. Large bureaucracies which emphasize
loyalty and obedience, both needs of the military, do not normally attract
persons who seek settings which foster their creativity or independence.
Should the Navy "cut its losses" and concentrate even more (for it is already
so oriented) on retaining those who have technical/managerial anchors and
motivated to ascend the hierarchy, simply recognizing that other types are not
good "fits" and either letting them go or actively weeding them out? Or,
should the Navy diversify its career development system to provide attractive
opportunities for those with more marginal anchors? If so, will there be enough
managerial/technical careerists to fill all the Navy's officer needs? If so,
is there a useful place for a wide variety of careerists in the Navy--or can
the Navy adapt to integrate such variety efficiently?
These are critical questions for a retention policy. They have impli-
cations for recruitment, selection, training and career development. Recom-
mendations are made later in the paper. The important point here is that good
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retention policy will somehow focus on the long-term career and will seek to
match career options with the anchors of various careerists.
b. Life/Family Development Issues . Most of the officer couples queried
felt good about the status of their life and their marriage, at least as good
as the American population generally. Nevertheless, U.S. Naval officers and
their families face some special stresses which deserve attention.
During the early stages of a career, (typically from ensign to lieutenant
junior grade in the Navy setting), the young careerist achieves his major
sense of identity through work and by adapting to the organization's demands.
This is the matching period: does he want this first job to become a career?
The organization, for its part, tries to learn whether the recruit will be an
asset: should it encourage him to stay with advancement and attractive as-
signments? Many careerists and organizations decide—mutually or unilaterally--
that they do not have a good career match.
In addition to the normal attrition expected in any organization during
this period, the Navy has some special problems. First, the "Navy way" requires
a form of work and family life often unlike that of the officer's own parents
or other familiar careerists. Not only must the officer work yery long hours,
he frequently leaves home for extended tours at sea. In the case of a fleet
ballistic missile (FBM) submarine officer, for example, the family must adjust
to having father home for three months and then away for three months. For
other officers, sea tours may last from two weeks to eight months. A tour
may be carefully planned or, as in the case of SSN attack submarine crews, it
may come without warning. Research on the family difficulties associated with
such separations establishes that it causes almost certain stress.
Other careers in American society also demand frequent travel and long
hours (the business executive), and on-off work rotations (airline crews).
What makes the Navy career model so unique is the frequency of travel, the
11.
extent of away-from-home time (up to a year away), and the fact that except
for the FBM officers, one cannot count on extended at-home time to compensate
for being away. Often officers just home from a cruise must put in yery long
hours in port to prepare for the next cruise--and junior officers get more
than their share of the dirty work. No wonder some begin to perceive a career
pattern which leaves them little time for anything except dedication to the
Navy.
Furthermore, marital role adjustments are almost axiomatically difficult
during this formative period. The couple must work out when/if he is the pa-
triarch, who will keep the finances, the parenting roles when he is at sea
and when he is home, her time at home and away from home, and how this corre-
sponds with his schedule. These are complex and intensvie role issues for
young couples to resolve.
Another adjustment is the conflict of values between young officer couples
and their seniors. Younger wives are more independent, more assertive when
their needs are not being met, and less apt to subordinate their needs to their
husband's work. Research shows that for many younger persons, self/ family de-
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velopment and lifestyle have often replaced work as the primary value (Emery,
on 21 22
Rapoport and Rapoport, Kanter, Hall and Hall ). Younger male careerists
are likely to share parenting roles and household tasks with their wives;
wives are apt to pursue their own careers. Further, many junior Navy couples
do not see promotions necessarily as "success"; rather, they are likely to de-
fine career-life success as finding work which corresponds with their personal
and family growth cycles, and is varied and interesting, or being a crafts-
person and doing something so well that they feel the pleasure of accomplishment
and the satisfaction of making a contribution to society.
Any one of these problems may be compounded by a "generation gap" be-
tween the struggling JO and his senior officers. Many senior officers, for
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instance, proclaim that the fun of being an officer is to be at sea (away from
home) "driving" an airplane, ship, or submarine—and find it natural to sub-
ordinate everything else to their careers. A "good" Navy wife is a superwoman
who manages efficiently while the husband is away but eagerly becomes subordin-
ate when he returns. She does not complain. She entertains well, stays phys-
ically attractive, and mixes socially with other wives, especially the wives
of her husband's peers and superiors. If she chooses a career of her own, it
is to keep herself busy while he is away and to boost family income. (Selling
real estate, for example, is ideal because she can choose her own hours and
quickly adjust her work to a new environment and the demands of his schedule.)
Thus, many junior officers reported to us that they found their seniors
unsympathetic and even hostile to family-oriented values. One surface warfare
lieutenant reported that a former commanding officer had given him perfect
ratings but with a qualifying footnote: "He could become CNO if he and his wife
just learned the Navy team concept." This, said the lieutenant, meant that he
was great but that his wife, pursuing her own studies, couldn't cope with all
that the CO's wife asked her to do. Similarly, a jet fighter pilot flight in-
structor exclaimed, "I'm getting out because as I get more senior, they also
want to include my wife in more activities and she doesn't want to be in the
Navy. She has her own career."
We found that this hostility from senior officers was not just junior
imagination. A senior captain in the submarines complained that an executive
officer was resigning at fourteen years of service "just because his wife keeps
bitching." He clearly felt that she had no right to be dissatisfied. An
aviator commanding officer said, "I don't understand the young wives. They're
ruining these guys' careers. If they would fall into line, half of my problems
would be resolved. They just need to mature beyond all this women's lib crap."
13.
One exception is the juniors whose fathers were also military—especially
Navy--officers. They know, for example, that the early period is the hardest
and simply adapt. The wives, especially if they have grown up in military
families, know how to be active outside the home when their husbands are away
and how to be available when their husbands are back. In short, their expecta-
tions match the Navy way of life and they develop effective coping mechanisms.
Also, on the positive side, some couples from rural areas and from lower-
middle-class backgrounds find that the Navy meets their needs for increased
status, good pay, job security, and an opportunity to retire at half of base
pay, still relatively young, so they can return "home" to live out their dreams.
They also perceive the Navy as an exciting opportunity, otherwise inaccessible,
to travel and see the world. The career, providing the husband performs ade-
quately, is quite secure and promises steady promotions and pay increases as
well as enviable benefits.
On the other hand, both wives and husbands report that the separations,
the heavy work loads and long hours, the uncertain schedules, and the eroding
benefits (e.g., the possibility that the twenty-year retirement option may be
discontinued and the de facto policy of five percent cost-of-living increases
in ten percent inflationary periods) often seem to offset the advantages. More-
over, while moving all around the world may be glamerous for newlyweds, it
becomes a disadvantage once the children reach school age.
In short, the four critical problems during the adjustment phase of a
Naval officer's early career are: (1) whether he feels that there is a good
match between his own aspirations and the Navy's requirements; (2) whether he
and his wife have come to terms with the Navy career-family model; (3) whether
the wife has accepted the Navy as a way of life where the advantages to the
family outweigh the disadvantages and where she sees the Navy as her career
too; and (4) whether the young officer couple will accept, or at least not be
14.
discouraged by their senior's values, will willingly comply--at least mini-
mal ly--but can still be who they are, can eventually change things to their
liking, or possibly can see themselves emulating some of the values of success-
ful superiors as they grow older.
Our study showed that the young officers most contented with family life
in the Navy were staff officers (CEC, supply) where sea duty and family sepa-
rations are limited, bachelors, childless couples, or married to a wife with
a flexible career; she could work intensely while her husband was away and
cut back when he reappeared. Where the spouses had both accepted the Navy
model as a way of life (or already knew it from their early family backgrounds),
they also seemed more willing to make the Navy a long and productive career.
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c. The Role of the Spouse and The Feminist Movement . Midcareer is
when the executive wife most typically becomes an active partner in her husband's
career. During the early-career phase while he is establishing his technical
competence and is heavily involved in work (partly because it meets his own
identity needs), the wife is expected mainly to pick up the loose ends at home,
24
not complain, and provide a peaceful refuge from her husband's daily pressures.
(Younger officers, asked how their wives can be helpful in their career, usu-
ally say "by not complaining.")
By late midcareer, however, lieutenant commanders are often in charge of
major departments or are executive officers, accomplishing most of their tasks
by working with people. To be promoted, they should entertain and be active
in Navy social life. Advancement beyond commander depends in large measure
on informal criteria ("politics") and on their "team" assets. The wife's role
changes at midcareer from unquestioning supporter to social manager. She is
largely responsible for creating a family image that will help her husband look
like good senior officer material. She should begin to involve herself with
other senior officer wives and to entertain. While on occasion she may not
15.
directly help her husband in a given billet, her actions—or lack of them--
can certainly hurt his career image.
Our research disclosed some junior officers who perceived their wives'
uneasiness with and fear of this new social role. Some wives were pushing to
leave—or at least to keep commitments minimal because they didn't want the
social-image pressure.
Partly because of the new set of problems confronting officers during
midcareer, wives seem to fall into five types as they respond:
Table 1
Types of Navy Wives at Midcareer
Type Dimensions Issues Attitude
Blind 1. Those who tie How can I help to His happiness is
Supporters lives exclusively advance our my happiness.
to husband's career career?
or see it as a "our"
two-person career.




and do not conflict
with his career.
Deferred 1. Some are happy How can I help I'm willing to wait
Gratifiers to enjoy the secur- him now so that but at some point
ity of Navy life and he (and the bene- it is my turn.
will develop their fits from his
own career interests, career) will help
if any, when their me in the future?
husband retires.
2. Others are some-
what angry at having
to delay gratifica-
tion in their life
until they can pur-














willing to put up
with the difficul-








2. Those whose ca-





on her own career
plans.
1 Some view work-
ing more as a job
which must accomo-




2. Others see work-
ing as a longterm












juniors who are ac-
customed to the life-
style and have seen
military marriages
modeled.
2. Those who are
themselves in the
Navy and are pur-
suing a dual career
with their husbands.
Issues




How can I have
meaningful work




How can I use
what I already




I have as much
right to a career
as he does and




active in his career
and the family (partly
because he is away so
much and for so long)
but my main priority
is my marriage and
family.
I can see the long-
term aspects of this
career and have seen
it work for others.
By doing my part, I
can reap numerous
benefits in the present
and the future.
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Many women fell into the category of deferred gratifiers. However, we
uncovered one potential conflict in the interviews: while wives were patiently
waiting their turn and expecting much emotional support from their husbands
after retirement, the husbands were often preparing to pursue an active second
career and did not see themselves as primarily supporting their wife's efforts
or expectations. Another problem was that many of these women seemed angry
and impatient at having to postpone their goals.
The careerist wives, a small percentage, seemed most at odds with the
Navy lifestyle and with their husband's career aspirations. They were most
likley to present their mates with ultimatums ("It's the Navy or me!") and
seemed prepared to risk their marriages for more independence. Most could not
see how they could pursue a viable career of their choice and be part of a
system which requires frequent moves, deprives them of their husband's time
and help, and demands their support for his career.
As expected, the blind supporters, accommodators, and insiders seemed
to be the most ideal companions for Naval officers at this career stage.
Twenty- five wives were interviewed, five from each of the Navy sub-com-
munities studied. Analyzing those interviews and the husbands' perceptions
about their wives' attitudes shows that all five categories seem to exist in
every Navy community, but that the dominant style seems to vary somewhat by
community.
It is not surprising that the most supportive wives are married to men
with the most stringent work requirements, the line officers in the surface,
sub-surface, and air communities. It is no coincidence either, that these
communities where the demands for a supportive family are greatest are also
the areas of critical officer shortages.
Some crucial factors affected individual wives in all communities,
factors with great impact on midcareer officers' productivity and satisfaction
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with the Navy. They are: (1) younger women seem better educated; they want
a career at some point in their lives more than women over thirty-five do;
(2) inflation and post-Vietnam War cutbacks have made the wife's career an
important source of additional income in many families; (3) the women's move-
ment has helped Navy wives seek an identity beyond the home; (4) the midcareer
officers themselves seem increasingly willing to change preconceived ideas
about their wife's role in his career--to be less threatened by limited sup-
port, even to assume that her support should not be a factor in his promotions,
and to support her outside- the-home pursuits, for instance, sharing child care
so that she can be more active.
Out of the five types of Navy wives, blind supporters, insiders, and
accommodators make the best wives for a man who wants success in the Navy. At
the same time, social forces are pushing Navy wives towards careers. Even
accommodators could become less-than-perfect Navy wives as husbands must be-
come more accommodating themselves; inevitably, the officer himself may reach
a point where he will be unwilling to be totally devoted to his own career.
Deferred gratifiers will almost certainly become more demanding if this social
trend persists, and will discover that the Navy has a very difficult time ac-
commodating careerist wives under its present strictures.
d. Dysfunctions of The Current Retirement System . The Navy, like any
large bureaucracy, has its own internal politics, and inevitably, its politicians.
To the extent that careerists can meet their personal career needs by playing
the political game "correctly", such apparently peripheral aspects of institu-
tional life may actually be crucial to retention. As Weber has pointed out,
playing politics is a critical dimension of any career success formula. In
this study, we focused on identifying Naval officers' self-interests to see if
there was a good match between these aspirations and the career opportunities
open to them in the Navy.
19,
In general, the Navy rewards competent and energetic officers who are
willing to work hard for promotions and subordinate their personal and family
needs, who have support from their wives and families, who want eventually
to become general managers, and who are not choosy about the specific nature
of their commands. The standard advice an officer gives on how to get ahead
is, "Take whatever billet you receive, work as hard as you can, and get ex-
cellent fitness reports." This is the image of perfect congruence which the
smart politician will try to create for himself. And most officers, by mid-
career, have perfected their images. The Navy, getting exactly what it wants,
does not probe beneath the surface.
At the same time, most officers agree that good fitness reports are not
enough. One must also get good billets or develop an impressive assignment
portfolio. Outstanding performance in difficult and important jobs is also
important. Because billets change every two or three years, accomplishments
must be concrete, short-term and highly visible. Many officers acknowledged
opting for objectives meeting their criteria for a two-year period.
They also pinpointed other ways of playing the political game: they
worked to develop a "service reputation"-- the image of a competent, energetic,
loyal, and team-oriented manager. They also fit into their subcommunity de-
liberately; pilots cultivated the image of being hard-drinking, hard-working,
and courageous, picking social interactions with peers and senior officers as
"demonstration" times. Finally, most officers acknowledge needing one or more
"sponsors," influential senior officers who can intervene when necessary to
help them get good billets, introduce them to influential persons, help them
make their service reputation, and even be members of the Selection Board when
they come up for promotion.
For example, officers often use autovan telephone lines to keep in touch
with their detailer, trying to influence him about their next billet even
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when they are overseas. Most officers, from discussions with peers and spon-
sors, have a very good idea of what is needed next for success. If an officer
t
gets the "wrong" assignment, it is common for a sponsor to call the detail er
or another influential person in his behalf and press for a change; many
changes are, in fact, negotiated.
The interviewed officers also mentioned the importance of serving in
several "high visibility" billets, where they could come into contact with
more senior officers. To be on an admiral's staff or in a Washington, D.C.,
assignment at the right time and place in a career is critical. Entertain-
ing, attending social functions, going to the officers' club for a drink,
housing or entertaining out-of-town visitors, are all opportunities for making
contacts and becoming known in the community. Having a supportive, bright,
attractive spouse with hostess skills is also helpful.
They discussed in some detail how to develop effective sponsor relation-
ships. When one encounters a CO who seems on his way up, the junior officer
tries especially hard to get his support and earn his respect, doing favors in
exchange for future commitments. If the JO happens to be in Washington, D.C.,
or Pearl Harbor where senior officers are plentiful, his gambit is to cultivate
numerous relationships. Naturally, after the contact has been made, the
younger officer will work hard to stay in contact and have a positive relation-
ship with these sponsors across their career.
The Navy itself encourages a JO to be perfectly open about trying for
good fitness reports, but the same officer must be somewhat more careful about
politicking for "visible" billets, socially scheming to create his service
reputation, and developing relationships with sponsors. While most Navy of-
ficers—including seniors—recognize the importance of these informal avenues
to success, it is considered in bad taste to seek them openly.
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Some comparisons with corporate business may be helpful, but in some ways,
the Navy's political system is unique, largely because of its twenty-year re-
tirement program. When an officer has invested ten years in the Navy, he is
very reluctant, regardless of incompatibilities, to leave and lose the benefits
of retiring at the end of twenty years with half of his highest pay plus med-
ical privileges and other important benefits. Our interviews uncovered a
surprising number of officers (about nineteen) with ten or more years of ex-
perience who were extremely dissatisfied and judged their self-interests as
basically mismatched. However, they had all resolved to remain their full
twenty years if possible.
One such officer was a surface warfare officer whose real goal was a
Ph.D. in management and a junior college teaching position. He worked hard
on his detailer for billets near universities. He also read extensively in
his field and wrote about relevant aspects of his Naval experiences to demon-
strate academic competence by publishing. He was to retire after twenty
years as a lieutenant commander, having deliberately chosen jobs during his
last seven years that enhanced his second career, not his naval career.
A supply corps lieutenant commander provided another example of incon-
gruency. As he progressed up the ladder, he realized that his wife and family
were increasingly important assets in his promotions; but his wife, an avid
feminist, despised what she regarded as chauvinism and authoritarianism in
the Navy. They struck a compromise. She would attend those functions and
perform those services absolutely necessary for his pre-retirement career
objectives. He would attend to most of them himself and provide the proper
excuses for her. She would also withhold her opinions about the Navy in
conversations where they could be used against her husband.
A third example is a submariner who had, with his wife and family, fallen
in love with a particular geographic location and wanted to settle there. He
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was making career compromises, trying to find a series of assignments which
would permit him to serve out his remaining ten years in that area and also
trying to convince his detailer that such a plan was in the Navy's interest
as well
.
A fourth case was an aviator, then a lieutenant commander, who wanted
to retire as a commander in five years without leaving San Diego where he
had a real estate business. He claimed to already possess holdings worth
$2 million and was studying for his broker's license.
We estimate from the interviews that 23 percent of the 145 officers
queried in the ten-to- twenty year range were mainly working on their second
career, not for the Navy. Of that sample, 43 percent worked on advancing
both their military and second career simultaneously. Another 23 percent
did not reveal enough information to make a good subjective judgment about
their intentions, and only 12 percent of the officers in the ten-to-twenty
year experience range indicated that the Navy was their primary and only
career consideration.
As a result, the Navy says that the way to earn promotions is through
competence and conformity. However, officers themselves recognize that the
informal organization is necessary to achieve the Navy's highest rewards.
Thus the importance of looking like "a Navy man" to make the highest rank
possible before retirement encourages covert strategies that inevitably will
create some situations where the Navy is being exploited for personal ends,
even though a good organizational reason to continue a second-career agenda
may be an apparent, not a real, conflict.
Our general impressions from conducting the interviews is that some 70
percent of the officers would resign their commissions immediately if re-
tiring with half of base pay at the end of twenty years were not an option.
Our guess is that few junior officers would join the Navy or remain, given
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the current career benefits, without the twenty-year program. Obviously,
this benefit successfully attracts and holds officers for the Navy, which
is certainly one of the reasons it was implemented. On the other hand, it
fosters long-term careerists who are not really committed to the Navy. While
they are not actively injuring the Navy by playing dirty politics, such a
career/organizational politics game still inhibits productivity and probably
shelters "dead wood" at the middle management ranks out of proportion with
corporate business or other organizations. It limits the Navy's own career
renewal and development options because minimal performance can become a
goal and has a reward at the end of a discrete period of time. Most impor-
tantly, it is a negative factor in the overall military goal of combat
readiness.
3. Recommendations and Conclusions
a. Issues of Career Fit . Most of the data from the study underscores
the fact that three types of careerists are most attracted to and enthusiastic
about the Navy as a long-term productive career. These are those with man-
agerial, technical and security career anchors. The technical types, how-
ever, often find themselves frustrated because upward mobility in the Navy
means adopting a more managerial orientation.
From the Navy's point of view, they seem to also need all three kinds
of careerists. They are benefited by some "yes" men whose main objective is
job security, even though those with a need to settle (geographic security
persons) would not normally be happy in a military career. They certainly
require officers prone to command. They also need persons with a technical
anchor, given the complexity of the modern Navy. This category of careerists
deserve further comment.
It may be important in the future to add a career track for technically
anchored persons. This could be similar to what already exists for
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physicians in the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, for example. Physicians
can reach the rank of Captain by remaining in their specialty. Or, it may
be more like the Air Force model where once a subspecialist (e.g., fighter
pilot, computer expert) one has the option of advancing up the hierarchy
in that speciality.
It is further recommended that the Navy not attempt to attract or
spend resources on career development for persons with creativity and au-
tonomy career anchors. In fact, it may make sense to attempt to detect
these persons and discourage their longtime association with the Navy.
b. Life/Family Development Issues . The Navy needs to educate its senior
officers as to the changing work values of the younger generation, especially
to their emphasis on self and family development. Such increased understand-
ing on the part of the CO would help the junior officer to at least feel that
his problems were understood and being considered.
More importantly, however, the Navy can no longer expect the same degree
of support from the spouse and the children in terms of continuously putting
the careerist's work in first place. More shore time, shorter cruises,
fewer family interruptions and more flexible scheduling when the careerist is
in port, better at-sea scheduling so that planning and expectation setting can
be accomplished, fewer moves, more consideration for the spouse's career-
all of these are work trends important to the population generally which
must also be taken into account by the Navy in future policies.
c. The Role of The Spouse and The Feminist Movement . As a result of
the women's movement, there are likely to be fewer "blind supporters" and
"deferred gratifier" types of wives in the future. There are likely to be
more "careerists". Since the role of Navy officer seems somewhat incompat-
ible with a "careerist" spouse, it may be well to not cater to such a family
situation. On the other hand, it will be very important in the future to,
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first, be supportive of "accommodator" wives and, second, cease to require
the traditional kinds of spousal support typical of what blind supporters
and deferred gratifiers were willing to render in the past.
d. The Retirement System . Of great importance in retention seems to
be the erosion of benefits—especially the ongoing policy debate about the
military retirement program. The recommendations which follow attempt to
consider many of the interrelated issues raised above but center on retire-




How can the Navy make the best use of the current retirement
policy? Some way of tying retirement benefits, including the option of
quitting with benefits after twenty years, should be linked to the perfor-
mance appraisal of officers. This benefit should be viewed as a reward for
meritorious service, not as a right.
2. How can the Navy recruit and retain valuable human resources
without this attractive policy? The situation is complicated by the erosion
of other career benefits and the lack of career options. If an officer could
make periodic decisions about staying or leaving based on current attrac-
tions as well as future benefits, the double tendency to psychologically
leave years before actually retiring and to defer all career gratification
until after retirement would be lessened. The Navy should provide attrac-
tive career benefits and options at various career stages to attract and
hold good people. The retirement policy should be only one attractive part
of a longterm career pattern.
3. What are some reasonable changes to make in the retirement
policy? Without enriching the career benefits and options, it would be fool-
ish to change the retirement policy, now one of the main attractions in
combatting the current retention problem. With newly improved career
26.
development policies, however, the retirement policy could be lengthened to
come after thirty rather than twenty years. Many of those who are second-
career oriented might wait six to eight years for such retirement benefits,
but not fifteen. This weeding-out device could be coupled with long-term
attention to detect plateauing and psychological retirement and negatively
reward them so that such officers would not benefit at retirement in the
same ways.
4. What about the larger problem of the midcareer plateau and how
is this problem similar to it? Some students of organization behavior are
currently advocating slowing down career advancement to allow for more stabil-
ity in organizations. The top of the pyramid is already crowded. Opportun-
ities do not exist for career enhancement at all levels across a long period
of time, which may be one of the main reasons for the lack of motivation and
the deferred gratification already existing at midcareer. Lengthening the
service period before retirement in the Navy would only intensify competition
unless the expectations of the promotion "schedule" were relaxed.
A more attractive option would be a more diverse and slower career track.
The myriad growth opportunities offered in the early career is largely a
factor of insufficient manpower. These opportunities could be spread out and
extended into midcareer. Other valuable shore and non-wartime specialty work
could be undertaken and rewarded along the way. More attention could be di-
rected to the needs of the careerist's family and a better match could be made
(e.g., more stable assignments when the kids are in high school). Numerous
options being considered by industry to address this same problem might pro-
vide helpful analogies for the Navy.
It is concluded that the officer retention problem is a serious one for
the U.S. Navy, both in retaining quantity and quality personnel. The study
has elaborated some aspects of career dissatisfaction which could be at the
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heart of the problem. What is needed are new career development policies
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